The Oracle Cases Settlement: Too Charitable to Ellison and the Plaintiffs\u27 Attorneys? by Frankel, Steven D.
DePaul Business and Commercial 
Law Journal 
Volume 4 
Issue 4 Summer 2006: Symposium - Old Code, 
New Code: Views on Bankruptcy from the 
Bench and Bar 
Article 8 
The Oracle Cases Settlement: Too Charitable to Ellison and the 
Plaintiffs' Attorneys? 
Steven D. Frankel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/bclj 
Recommended Citation 
Steven D. Frankel, The Oracle Cases Settlement: Too Charitable to Ellison and the Plaintiffs' Attorneys?, 4 
DePaul Bus. & Com. L.J. 625 (2006) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/bclj/vol4/iss4/8 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Business and Commercial Law Journal by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. 
For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
The Oracle Cases Settlement:
Too Charitable to Ellison and the Plaintiffs' Attorneys?
Steven D. Frankel*
I. INTRODUCTION
Allegations that Larry Ellison, CEO of Oracle Corporation, had en-
gaged in insider trading of the company's shares to the tune of close to
a billion dollars made headlines in 2001.' More recently, what has
made headlines is a settlement that Ellison, Oracle, and a group of
plaintiff shareholders reached to end a lawsuit based on these allega-
tions in California state court.2 A judge approved the proposed settle-
ment after the parties modified it so that Ellison rather than Oracle
would be responsible for paying millions of dollars in plaintiffs' attor-
neys' fees.3 Descriptions of the settlement have included "novel," 4
"the first of its kind,"5 and "extremely unusual."'6 Rather than pro-
vide any direct benefit to Oracle, as is typically the case with damages
in shareholder derivative lawsuits, the main settlement provision re-
quires Ellison to give $100 million to charity on Oracle's behalf and in
its name.7 Past settlements have required the defendant to contribute
some money to charity; however, Ellison's settlement is the first to
provide that the recovery will go solely to charity.8 Several commen-
* J.D. from DePaul University College of Law expected 2007; Colgate University, B.A., 2002.
1. Peter Burrows, The Lords of Tech: What Were They Thinking?, Bus. WK., Mar. 19, 2001, at
40. See also Kelly Zito, Oracle Hits Its Revised Profit Call, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 16, 2001, at B1.
2. Michael Liedtke, Oracle CEO to Pay $122 Mil. In Stock-Trade Suit, CHI. SUN TIMES, Nov.
23, 2005, at 80. See also Bloomberg News, Oracle Chief to Pay Millions in Legal Fees, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2005, at C6.
3. Judgment of Dismissal, Oracle Cases, No. CIV417511, 2005 WL 3438589 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Nov. 22, 2005).
4. California Judge Nixes Oracle CEO's Offer to Pay $100M to Charity to Settle Suit, 21 No. 7
ANDREWS CORP. OFF. & DIRECTORS LIAB. LITIG. REP. 2, Oct. 3, 2005.
5. Id.
6. Benjamin Pimentel, Ellison to Settle Suit with $100 Million Deals Needs Court OK, Could
Affect Pending Lawsuit, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 13. 2005, at D1 (quoting John Coffee, a law professor
at Columbia University).
7. Id.
8. California Judge Nixes Oracle CEO's Offer to Pay $100M to Charity to Settle Suit, supra
note 4. See Michael Bazeley & Deborah Lohse, Three Executives Settle Lawsuit Over IPO 'Spin-
ning', SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 29, 2005; see also Stipulation and Agreement of Compro-
mise, Settlement and Release of Claims, In re EBay, Inc. S'holders Litig., 2005 WL 1046779
(Del. Ch. Apr.28 2005). Several executives at EBay were sued derivatively for their receipt of
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tators have criticized the settlement for not providing damages di-
rectly to Oracle, whose shareholders, as owners of the company, were
ultimately but indirectly harmed by the alleged insider trading. 9
Courts must strike a balance between two competing objectives
when deciding whether to approve a proposed settlement of a share-
holder derivative lawsuit. On one hand, public policy generally favors
the settlement of litigation as a means of avoiding unnecessarily pro-
tracted lawsuits. A settlement should reflect a fair assessment by each
party of the relative merits of its case and the chances of achieving a
favorable outcome, making a settlement possible once the parties' as-
sessments converge. This is likely to be achieved when the settlement
is the product of arms-length bargaining. One the other hand, the pol-
icy of resolving litigation should not come at the cost of encouraging
unfair settlements. Unfair settlements resulting from collusive behav-
ior between the parties are a big concern with shareholder derivative
litigation, as will be further explained later in this Note. This concern
is particularly acute when the value of the settlement is difficult to
determine, such as with non-pecuniary settlements, or, as here, when
the settlement consists mainly of a charitable donation. Therefore, in
light of this concern, the primary issues are whether a charitable dona-
tion can possibly be an adequate settlement in a derivative lawsuit,
and, if so, what framework a court should use to assess whether such a
settlement is fair and reasonable rather than the product of collusive
behavior.
Part II of this Note will provide a brief discussion of shareholder
derivative lawsuits, with a highlight on the settlement of such lawsuits.
This section will also give an overview of the statutory and case law
that deals with charitable donations by corporations. The focus will
be on California law, given its applicability to the Ellison settlement,
and Delaware law, given the importance of that state's corporate law.
This Note will also reference illustrative case law from other jurisdic-
tions. Part III will outline the Oracle lawsuit and settlement in more
detail. Part IV will contend that courts should allow, and in fact en-
initial public offering shares from investment bankers trying to drum up investment banking
business. Id. The executives settled the lawsuits for $3 million, with half of the settlement going
to charities, including the Boys and Girls Club of Northern California. Id.
9. See Pimentel, supra note 6, (quoting Columbia University Professor John Coffee, who
questions "whether the plaintiffs' attorneys are entitled to be charitable with other people's
money."). See also Mike Langberg, Did Ellison's Insider Trading Settlement Benefit Oracle?, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 16, 2005 (wondering whether the Oracle Cases settlement was a
way for Ellison to "game the system," particularly in light of Ellison's already substantial philan-
thropic activities); see generally Floyd Norris, When Charity Stems from a Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 16, 2005, at C1 (asking whether the proposed settlement would really benefit Oracle
shareholders).
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courage, settlements of shareholder derivative lawsuits that mainly
provide for charitable donations in the company's name, subject, of
course, to the same inquiry always made in such lawsuits to make sure
that the settlements are fair and not the result of collusion. As part of
this inquiry, the court should be required to find that the charitable
donation comprising such a settlement provide at least some direct or
indirect benefit to the corporation. Moreover, the fact that the settle-
ment calls for the company to pay attorneys' fees should not necessa-
rily result in the court rejecting the settlement. This section will then
analyze the Oracle Cases settlement and the judge's rejection of the
original settlement and approval of the revised settlement. Next, Part
V will explore the impact of the Oracle Cases settlement. Finally, Part
VI will provide a conclusion to this Note.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Basics of Shareholder Derivative Lawsuits
In order to understand why the Oracle Cases settlement is so unu-
sual and why settlements of shareholder derivative lawsuits can be
problematic (which this Note will explain later), this section will
briefly review the basics of the shareholder derivative lawsuit. A
shareholder may file two different types of lawsuits; one type is a di-
rect action and the other type is a derivative action. 10 A shareholder's
claim is either a direct action or a derivative action; the two types of
actions are mutually exclusive. 1 The core differences between direct
and derivative actions are: 1) to whom the cause of action belongs
(i.e., who suffered the alleged harm) and 2) who, as a result, is entitled
to the benefit of any recovery.12
In a direct action, the company or its officers are alleged to have
committed a direct harm to the shareholder interest of a specific
shareholder (or class of shareholders). 13 Only the harmed share-
holder is entitled to recovery and the recovery goes directly to that
shareholder.' 4 In contrast, the purpose of a shareholder derivative
lawsuit is to allow a shareholder (or shareholders) to rectify a wrong
committed against the corporation on which the corporation fails to
act. 15 The cause of action belongs to the harmed corporation rather
10. Schuster v. Gardner, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468, 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
11. Id.
12. Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004).
13. Shuster, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d at 473.
14. Id.; Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1036.
15. McDermott, Will & Emery v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 622, 625 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000).
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than the shareholder as an individual. 16 For instance, in the recently
decided case of Shuster v. Gardner, the court explained that, under
California law, "[a]n action is derivative if 'the gravamen of the com-
pliant is injury to the corporation, or to the whole body of its stock or
property without any severance of distribution among individual hold-
ers. .... 1117 In Schuster, the court found that the claim was derivative
under both California and Delaware law' 8 , relying in part on the Del-
aware Supreme Court's holding in Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin &
Jenrette, Inc19. In Tooley, the court noted that a claim is derivative
rather than direct if, in order to obtain a favorable outcome, the
shareholder must demonstrate an injury to the corporation.20
The nature and purpose of a derivative action has several implica-
tions-two of which are particularly important to the focus of this
Note. 21  First, several key parties are necessarily part of the litigation
of a shareholder derivative claim.22 These include: 1) the plaintiff
shareholder, whom is only nominally the plaintiff since the corpora-
tion is the real party of interest; 2) the wrongdoer defendants, which
are often officers, directors, or agents of the corporation; and 3) the
corporation itself, which is nominally a defendant but which, as stated
above, is actually akin to the plaintiff in practice. 23 Although of
course not technically a party to the litigation, another important par-
ticipant one should not overlook, for reasons given in the next section,
is the plaintiff shareholder's attorneys.
Second, because the wrongdoer harmed the corporation rather than
the shareholder plaintiffs, any recovery belongs to the corporation. 24
The corporation may receive any remedy to which it would have been
entitled, had the corporation itself sued. 25 The possible remedies in-
16. Id.
17. Schuster, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 473 (citing Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 592,
598 (Cal. 1969).
18. Id.
19. 845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 2004).
20. Id. at 1039.
21. The following are two other implications that arise based on the nature and purpose of a
derivative action. First, the shareholder seeking to file such a lawsuit must satisfy a "demand
requirement" that the shareholder first ask the company to take action and the company refuse
to do so. 13 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRI-
VATE CORPORATIONS § 5963 (2006). Second, since the shareholder is suing on behalf of the
corporation, the shareholder must own the stock at the time the alleged wrongdoing occurred
and must remain a shareholder during the course of the litigation. Id. § 5972.
22. Id. §§ 5994-5998.
23. Id.; Schuster v. Gardner, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 473.
24. FLETCHER supra note 21, § 6038; Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1036.
25. FLETCHER supra note 21, § 6027.
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clude damages, injunctions, or an accounting.26 When the recovery is
in the form of monetary damages, the defendant wrongdoers usually
pay these directly to the corporation. This second point is the primary
reason why the Oracle Cases settlement at issue here is considered to
be so unusual, with the recovery being given to charity in the name of
Oracle Corporation-the de facto plaintiff-rather than to the com-
pany itself. Some of the criticism of the Oracle Cases settlement, in
particular, and the more general issue as to whether courts should ap-
prove such settlements is based on the unusual nature of such
settlements.27
B. Settlement of Shareholder Derivative Lawsuits
1. Potential Concerns with Shareholder Derivative
Lawsuit Settlements
While the terms of the settlement in the Oracle Cases may be unu-
sual or novel, settlements in shareholder derivative lawsuits are hardly
out of the ordinary. 28 In fact, one study found that litigants settled
nearly 65% of all derivative suits. 29 This is despite only a 6% success
rate for plaintiffs in cases that the parties fully adjudicated. 30 Many of
these settlements did not provide for monetary damages but instead
called for non-pecuniary measures such as corporate governance or
corporate structure changes. 31 In contrast, the vast majority of these
settlements provided the plaintiffs' attorneys with fee awards, regard-
less of the terms of the settlement. 32
The high settlement rate and the other findings of the study point to
two distinct but related concerns with derivative lawsuit settlements.
The first is the "strike suit," where the shareholder plaintiff and his or
her attorneys bring a non-meritorious action in order to try to procure
a settlement.33 The second concern is a collusive settlement, where a
claim has merit but the parties settle for less than what is fair given the
26. Id. § 6029.
27. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
28. See Tim Oliver Brandi, The Strike Suit: A Common Problem of the Derivative Suit and the
Shareholder Class Action, 98 DICK. L. REV. 355, 385 (2001) (noting that some studies have
shown that settlement rates in shareholder litigation tend to be higher than in other civil
litigation).
29. Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 55, 60 (1991).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 61.
32. Id.
33. Brandi, supra note 28, at 357.
2006] 629
630 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
strength of the shareholder's claims.34 Both of these potential
problems stem from the same source-the nature of the derivative
lawsuit and the resulting incentives to the various litigants.
The easiest way to explain how the nature of the derivative lawsuit
leads to the problem of strike suits and collusive settlements is to ex-
plore the incentives that each of the litigating parties has to settle,
even if the resulting settlement is unfair to that litigant. Foremost,
there is the plaintiff shareholder, or more realistically, the plaintiff
shareholder's attorneys. Because of the relatively small stake that any
individual shareholder has in any recovery in a derivative action,
which belongs to the defendant company, and the costs of monitoring
the attorneys, the shareholder's attorneys are likely to determine
when to settle and what the settlement terms will be.3 5 Therefore, the
incentives that drive the decision of whether and how to settle are
those of the attorneys rather than the shareholder-a classic agency
problem.36 The ability to collect attorneys' fees gives the attorneys
reason to settle.37 Not surprisingly, when the claim has little merit and
the chances of losing at trial are high, the attorney would prefer to
settle and collect attorneys' fees based on that outcome.38 If the
claims do have merit, the attorney still has an incentive to settle, even
if the settlement is unreasonably low. This is because settling the
claim obviates the risk that the shareholder will lose at trial despite
the lawsuit's merits, thus giving the attorneys no fee award.39 In addi-
tion, the amount of the attorneys' fee award primarily is based on the
number of hours billed rather than the size of the recovery, so there is
really no incentive to reject a low monetary or non-pecuniary
settlement.40
The wrongdoer defendant, on the other hand, has an obvious incen-
tive to agree to an unduly meager settlement of a meritorious deriva-
tive action. However, even if the plaintiff's case is weak, the
wrongdoer defendant still has reason to settle. One reason for this is
that the wrongdoer defendant may be adverse to even a small risk of
losing the litigation and the potential for a large judgment; paying a
smaller amount or agreeing to non-pecuniary measures in a settlement
34. Matthew Anderson, An Intervention Requirement Provides Greater Benefit to the Corpora-
tion When Nonparty Shareholders Appeal Derivative Action Settlements: Felzen v. Andreas, 134
F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 1998), 79 NEB. L. REV. 171, 193 (2000).
35. Id. at 192-193.
36. Id.
37. Brandi, supra note 28, at 389.
38. Id. at 390-391.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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is likely to be preferable. 41 Moreover, directors' and officers' liability
insurance and indemnification by the company typically will cover the
wrongdoer defendant for a settlement but not for a final judgment
against the defendant that finds him or her to have engaged in
wrongdoing. 42
Finally, the company is likely to acquiesce in any settlement
reached between the plaintiff shareholder and the wrongdoer defen-
dant. Even if the claim has merit and the agreed settlement is too low,
the corporation may wish to avoid the hassle or potential embarrass-
ment of litigation.43  Also, the wrongdoer defendant may exert
enough control over the company to make the acceptance of too low a
settlement likely. With a non-meritorious claim, the company may
still be driven by a desire to not litigate and its status as the benefici-
ary of any recovery.
2. Court Approval of Settlements
The risk of strike suits or collusive settlements has resulted in the
requirement that a court approve any settlement of a shareholder de-
rivative action. In the federal courts and in some state courts, a stat-
ute or rule has codified the court approval requirement.4 4 In
Delaware, Chancery Court Rule 23.1 mandates that, with regard to
derivate actions by shareholders, "the action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the Court. ' 45 California does
not have a similar codified rule, but several cases have explicitly stated
that court approval is necessary for settlement of derivative actions.46
Once parties to a derivative action have concluded settlement nego-
tiations, a trial court will conduct a hearing to determine whether it
should approve the proposed settlement. In order to make this deter-
mination, the court looks at the discovery record in an attempt to
evaluate the relative strengths of the claims and defenses put forth by
the parties; the court, however, does not decide contested facts.47 The
court then is to "exercise an informed judgment whether the proposed
41. Id. at 386-387.
42. Id. at 387-388.
43. Andrew J. Sockol, A Natural Evolution: Compulsory Arbitration of Shareholder Deriva-
tive Suits in Publicly Traded Corporations, 77 TUL. L. REV. 1095, 1104 (2003).
44. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 626(d) (McKinney 2003); COLO. R.
Civ. P. 23.1.
45. DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1.
46. E.g., Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 219 Cal. Rptr. 74, 79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Ensher v. En-
sher, Alexander, & Barshoom, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 732, 734 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960).
47. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d. 959, 961 (Del. Ch. 1996).
20061
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settlement is fair and reasonable in the light of all relevant factors. '48
Some of the relevant factors include:
(1) the probable validity of the claims, (2) the apparent difficulties
in enforcing the claims through the courts, (3) the collectibility of
any judgment recovered, (4) the delay, expense and trouble of liti-
gation, (5) the amount of the compromise as compared with the
amount and collectibility of a judgment, and (6) the views of the
parties involved, pro and con.49
The court must gauge the "adequacy of the consideration offered to
the corporation in exchange for the release of all claims made or aris-
ing from the facts alleged." 50 When exercising this judgment the court
is supposed to protect the best interests of the corporation-the real
party of interest to the lawsuit-and the corporation's non-litigant
shareholders, who will be barred from future claims if the court ap-
proves the settlement. 51 Given the risk of collusion and the effect on
future litigation, the proponents of the settlement bear the burden of
persuasion to demonstrate that the settlement is in fact fair and rea-
sonable.52 Finally, in Maher v. Zapata Corporation, the court stated
that the judge "must reject a settlement agreement no matter how
acceptable it may otherwise be, if it is not free from collusion or
fraud." 53
The strong incentives for collusion in derivative action settlements
make the court's job difficult even when the settlement is entirely pe-
cuniary. The court's task becomes even more difficult in the case of a
settlement involving hard-to-measure non-pecuniary benefits.54 In
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, a group of shareholders brought a deriv-
ative action for breach of fiduciary duty when Bell Atlantic Corp.
agreed to pay $40 million in refunds to customers after the Penn-
sylvania Attorney General made allegations of consumer fraud by one
of Bell Atlantic's subsidiaries. 55 The shareholders and the company
reached a settlement to the derivative action, with the company agree-
ing to: 1) disclose information about the consumer fraud claims in its
proxy statement and 2) adopt new procedures to monitor its sales and
marketing programs out of which the consumer fraud allegations
arose.56 In analyzing the settlement, the court first acknowledged the
48. Id. at 966.
49. Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986).
50. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 961.
51. Id. at 966.
52. Id. at 967.
53. Maher v. Zapata Corp., 714 F.2d 436, 457 (5th Cir. 1983).
54. Sockol, supra note 43, at 1102.
55. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1306 (3d Cir. 1993).
56. Id. at 1306-07.
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potential problems with a non-pecuniary settlement, observing that
"nonmonetary relief may be used to mask an unfair settlement that
benefits individual defendants and plaintiffs' counsel but not the cor-
poration. '57 The court envisioned a situation in which the parties, in
reliance on the "valuation problem" presented by non-pecuniary re-
lief, collude to exchange merely cosmetic measures for plaintiff's at-
torneys' fees. 58 Despite this caveat, the court held the settlement to
be fair and reasonable. 59 The court reasoned that the settlement
terms, which included measures to prevent future consumer fraud by
the company's employees, conferred a benefit to Bell Atlantic. 60
While this benefit might have been small, according to the court, it
was adequate consideration given the weakness of the shareholder
claims of breach of fiduciary duty.61 The application of the business
judgment rule, a provision in Bell Atlantic's charter shielding com-
pany directors from liability for negligence, and the fact that lower
level employees of a subsidiary perpetrated the alleged consumer
fraud reduced the probability of the shareholders succeeding in their
derivative action.62 Finally, only a small percentage of Bell Atlantic
shareholders objected to the proposed settlement. 63
Similarly, in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation,
the Delaware Chancery Court approved a settlement that called only
for non-pecuniary governance and corporate structure changes. 64 In
Caremark, the company agreed to pay $250 million in a plea agree-
ment to resolve government charges that the company had violated a
law prohibiting payments made to secure the referral of Medicaid and
Medicare patients.65 Shareholders filed a derivative action, alleging
that Caremark's directors had breached their fiduciary duty of care
and, therefore, should be liable to the company for the $250 million.66
The shareholder plaintiffs, the defendant directors, and Caremark's
Board came to a settlement of the derivative action. 67 The settlement
provided no monetary damages, instead requiring Caremark to under-
take to prevent payments for referrals, change the way it interacts
with physicians and hospitals, and form a Compliance and Ethics
57. Id. at 1314.
58. Id. at 1311-12.
59. Id. at 1318.
60. Bell Atlantic Corp., 2 F.3d at 1312.
61. Id. at 1314.
62. Id. at 1312-14.
63. Id. at 1313-14.
64. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
65. Id. at 960-61.
66. Id. at 964.
67. Id. at 965.
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Committee to ensure compliance with the law.68 The court approved
the settlement despite the "very modest benefits. '69 The court deter-
mined that the "consideration appears fully adequate" given the lack
of evidence that the directors had failed to properly oversee the ac-
tions of lower-level employees and the resulting weakness of the
shareholders' claims. 70
3. Plaintiffs' Attorneys' Fees
As noted above, the vast majority of settlements in shareholder de-
rivative cases result in the plaintiff's attorney receiving a fee award. 71
The corporation is typically the payor of such a fee award since the
plaintiff shareholder has brought the claim on the corporation's behalf
and the corporation is supposed to be the beneficiary of any recov-
ery.72 A court may not approve a settlement with a provision for at-
torneys' fees unless the corporation receives a benefit. 73 Under the
common fund doctrine, the settlement awards attorneys' fees out of a
common fund created or preserved by the litigation, through either a
final judgment or a settlement.74 A common fund is created as the
result of a monetary settlement.75 Still, a non-monetary settlement
does not preclude an award of fees to the plaintiff's attorneys. 76 With
settlements only involving non-pecuniary provisions, a settlement may
award attorneys' fees under the substantial benefit doctrine.77 The
substantial benefit doctrine allows the settlement to provide for attor-
neys' fees if the settlement confers a substantial benefit on the corpo-
ration; the benefit must be "actual and concrete. '78
Under both doctrines, when the parties negotiate the attorneys' fees
as part of a settlement, the court must assess the negotiated fees as
part of its inquiry into the fairness and reasonableness of the settle-
ment. 79 The negotiated fees do not have to be exactly what the court
itself would have awarded had there been no provision for attorneys'
68. Id. at 966.
69. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 972.
70. Id. at 971.
71. Romano, supra note 23, 61.
72. 13 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE COR-
PORATIONS § 6044 (2006).
73. Sockol, supra note 43, at 1102.
74. Cziraki v. Thunder Cats, Inc., 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419, 422-23 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
75. Id.
76. Sockol, supra note 43, at 1102.
77. Cziraki, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 423.
78. Robbins v. Alibrandi, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 387, 393 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
79. Id. at 394-95.
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fees, but the negotiated fees must be within the same range. 80 The
court has to be wary of any signs of collusion evident from the amount
of the attorneys' fees or the circumstances that led up to the proposed
settlement.8' The most important factor in assessing whether the ne-
gotiated fees are fair is that they "bear a reasonable relationship to
the value of the attorney's work. ' 82 Bearing on the value of the attor-
neys' work are variables such as number of hours spent and the com-
plexity of the litigation.83 The court must also assure that the payment
of the negotiated fees will not be unduly burdensome to the corpora-
tion, as might be the case if the cost of the settlement to the corpora-
tion were to vastly outweigh the value of the settlement to the
corporation. 84
C. The Power of Corporations to Make Charitable Donations
1. Statutory Law
All fifty states (plus the District of Columbia) statutorily authorize
corporations to donate to charitable, scientific, and educational causes
and institutions.85 The Delaware corporate donations statute is repre-
sentative of the statutes in a large number of states. 86 The Delaware
statute provides that corporations have the power to "make donations
for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational pur-
poses .... "87 California's statute, while worded differently, gives cor-
porations the same leeway, if not more, to make donations. The
statute provides that corporations have the power to "[m]ake dona-
tions, regardless of specific corporate benefit, for the public welfare or
for community fund, hospital, charitable, educational, scientific, civic
or similar purposes. '88 However, a quick reading of their language
80. Id. at 396.
81. Id. at 395.
82. Id. at 396.
83. Robbins, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 394.
84. Id. at 395.
85. R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Giving at the Office: A Reappraisal of Charitable
Contributions by Corporations, 54 Bus. LAW. 965, 970 (1999).
86. Id. The authors note that corporate donations statutes fall into one of three general cate-
gories. A handful of states, including California, explicitly require no corporate benefit. The
remainder of states split about evenly between single-provision statutes similar to Delaware's
and statutes that have two separate provisions. In the latter states, the first provision is similar to
Delaware's single provision, while a second provision specifically provides for donations made to
further the interest of the corporation so long as the donations are otherwise lawful. Id.
87. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (2005). Similar to the Delaware statute is the current
version of the Revised Model Business Corporations Act. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr
§ 3.02(13) (2005) ("Unless its articles of incorporation provide otherwise... (13) to make dona-
tions for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific, or educational purposes...
88. CAL. CORP. CODE § 207(e) (2005).
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makes it clear that these statutes offer scant guidance to courts as to
what standard should govern the propriety of a given corporate dona-
tion. In most states, the corporate philanthropy statutes are
unrestrictive. 89
2. Case Law: What Standard Governs Corporate
Charitable Donations?
There has been little litigation over the propriety of specific corpo-
rate donations. 90 The two most recent of only four cases since 1950
dealing with corporate charitable donations directly have both taken
place in Delaware.91 Given the influence of Delaware corporate law,
these two cases are likely to have a significant amount of persuasive
authority in other jurisdictions.
Theodora Holding Corporation v. Henderson, the first of the Dela-
ware cases, sought to annunciate an express standard for corporate
charitable donations.92 In Theodora, a minority shareholder of Alex-
ander Dawson, Inc. sued the defendant, a controlling shareholder,
who had committed the company to a $528,000 donation of company
stock to the Alexander Dawson Foundation. 93 The foundation, a
charitable trust run by the defendant, was to use the funds in question
to operate a western camp for under-privileged boys. 94 The minority
shareholder alleged that the donation was improper. 95 Significantly,
the $528,000 donations represented less than three percent of the cor-
poration's annual income of over $19 million.96 The court applied a
test of reasonableness to determine whether the charitable gift made
89. Balotti & Hanks, supra note 85, at 972. However, a couple states do include restrictions in
their corporate donations statute. Massachusetts' corporate donations statute limits donations by
corporations with capital stock to one-half of one percent of its capital and surplus at the end of
the preceding fiscal year unless stockholders approve a greater amount. For corporations with-
out capital stock, donations are limited to one-half of one percent of the surplus at the end of the
preceding fiscal year unless the members of the corporation approve a greater amount. MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 155, § 12C (West 2005). See also VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-627(A)(12) (2005).
90. See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Cor-
porate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579, 605 n.101 (1997).
91. See id. One of the two non-Delaware cases directly dealing with corporate donations is
A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953). The other is Union Pacific R.R. v.
Trustees, Inc., 329 P.2d 398 (Utah 1958). This Note focuses on the Delaware cases because they
were the first and only cases to adopt an express standard for corporate donations. While not
expressly addressing the standard for corporate charitable donations, it is also interesting to note
that the Supreme Court of California did allude to a test of reasonableness in Memorial Hosp.
Ass'n of Stanislaus County v. Pacific Grape Prod. Co. See 290 P.2d 481, 483 (Cal. 1955).
92. Theodora Holding Corp., 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969).
93. Id. at 400-01.
94. Id. at 402.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 405.
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pursuant to the Delaware statute was proper or not.97 The court
noted that, at 2.7% of the corporation's annual gross income, the do-
nation was less than the 5% limit for federal tax deductions of charita-
ble donations. 98 The court explicitly said that the Internal Revenue
Code provided a guidepost against which courts could size up the rea-
sonableness of a corporate charitable donation. 99 The court also
pointed out that the donation reduced the corporation's capital gains
taxes and was a small price to pay to help ameliorate social tensions
arising from "large private holdings" over the longer term. 00 Given
the above reasons, along with the fact that providing money to the
youth camp was in line with public policy, the court determined that
the donation was reasonable. 1°1 Based on this determination, the
Chancery Court held that the charitable donation to the foundation
was proper.10 2
A second and more recent Delaware case, Sullivan v. Hammer, fol-
lowed the test of reasonableness set forth in Theodora.103 In Sullivan,
a Special Committee of Occidental Petroleum Corporation had ap-
proved a corporate donation for the construction of an art museum
adjacent to its California headquarters and other financial support for
the museum. 104 The museum was to be named The Armand Hammer
Museum of Art and Cultural Center, after Armand Hammer, the
Chairman of Occidental's Board. 10 5 Several shareholders sued to
challenge the donation after the company announced the gift, claim-
ing that the donation was improper. 10 6 The plaintiff shareholders and
the defendants agreed to settle the matter, but several shareholders
whom had filed separate claims objected to the settlement. 10 7 The
Court of Chancery approved the settlement, concluding that the plain-
tiffs' claims were weak since the donation met the test of reasonable-
ness.108 The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the lower court's
97. Theodora, 257 A.2d at 405.
98. Id. The Internal Revenue Code deduction limitation for charitable donations is currently
set at 10% of the company's taxable income for the year. 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(2)(2005).
99. Theodora, 257 A.2d at 405.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Sullivan v. Hammer, No. CIV.A.10823, 1990 WL 114223, at *6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 14, 1990).
104. Id. at *1.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at *2. The terms of the settlement allowed the museum plan to go forward with sev-
eral conditions. These conditions included naming the building the "Occidental Petroleum Cul-
tural Center Building" and recognizing the company as the museum's corporate sponsor in
advertising materials. Id. at *3.
108. Sullivan, 1990 WL 114223, at *5.
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approval of the settlement. 0 9 The Supreme Court of Delaware noted
its agreement with the Court of Chancery in Theodora that the correct
test was one of reasonableness, informed by the Internal Revenue
Code's provisions dealing with deductions for corporate donations."t 0
Further, the Supreme Court of Delaware wrote, "The Court of Chan-
cery recognized that not every charitable gift constitutes a valid corpo-
rate action. Nevertheless, the Court of Chancery concluded, given the
net worth of Occidental, its annual net income before taxes, and the
tax benefits to Occidental, that the gift to the Museum was within the
range of reasonableness established in Theodora."11'
3. Types of Corporate Donations: Must There Be a Benefit to
the Corporation?
Professors Balotti and Hanks identify three distinct types of corpo-
rate donations-i) "personal aggrandizement/pet-charity" donations,
2) "altruistic" donations, and 3) "business-benefit" donations. 112 The
first two types do not involve any "demonstrable benefit" to the cor-
poration.113 For the "personal aggrandizement/pet-charity" donation,
the motivation for the donation is the personal preferences of the
company official making the donation; the donation is either to a pet
charity or in some other way for the personal aggrandizement of the
official. 114 As its name implies, the motivation for an "altruistic" do-
nation is entirely altruistic.11 5 Finally, there is the "business-benefit"
corporate donation, where the charitable contribution confers a "de-
monstrable benefit" on the corporation.1 6 Potential benefits to the
corporation arising from corporate charitable donations may include
use of donations as a marketing and advertising tool, generation of
goodwill for the corporation, and attraction of shareholders by em-
phasizing the corporation's "social responsibility. ' 117 In many cases,
109. Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 63 (Del. 1991).
110. Id. at 61.
111. Id.
112. Balotti & Hanks, supra note 85, at 968.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Balotti & Hanks, supra note 85, at 967. See also Kahn, supra note 90, at 662-674. While
locating source materials outlining the theoretical benefits to corporations of making charitable
donations was easy, empirical evidence of such benefits proved harder to come by. One of the
only sources found was a telephone survey by Cone, Inc., a marketing and public relations firm
that specializes in "cause-related" marketing. Press Release, Cone, Inc., Multi-Year Study Finds
21% Increase in Americans Who Say Corporate Support of Social Issues is Important in Build-
ing Trust (Dec. 8, 2004), available at http://www.coneinc.com/Pages/pr_30.html. Among the sur-
vey's findings was that a large majority of those responding would switch to a similar product
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the extent of the benefit to the corporation, or whether there is actu-
ally a benefit at all, depends on such factors as the publicity that the
donation gets and the reactions of the relevant parties (such as con-
sumers) to the donations. 118
The permissive standard of reasonableness adopted by the Dela-
ware courts does not put much restraint on corporate donations. Is
there any requirement that a charitable donation confer a benefit on
the corporation in addition to meeting the reasonableness test? Most
of corporation law is based on principles of profit maximization; how-
ever, corporate donations law has often been justified on the grounds
of "social responsibility" and public policy.119 As long as corporate
donations law is not based on profit maximization theory, then a ben-
efit is not necessarily required. Addressing the question expressly, the
California corporate donations statute provides that corporations may
make donations "regardless of specific corporate benefit."'120 It is not,
however, entirely certain whether or not there is any requirement of a
benefit to the corporation in other states with statutes similar to Dela-
ware's statute.12'
The Delaware case law, at the very least, recognizes that a court
may properly consider any benefit to the corporation as an important
factor when analyzing the reasonableness of a given corporate dona-
tion. For instance, in Theodora, the court takes into account that the
"relatively small loss of immediate income.. .is far out-weighed by the
overall benefits flowing from the placing of such gift in channels
where it serves to benefit those in need of philanthropic or educa-
tional support, thus providing justification for large private holdings,
thereby benefiting plaintiff in the long run. ' 122 As stated earlier, the
court's assessment of reasonableness also included the reduction in
the company's capital gains taxes resulting from the donation. 123 Per-
haps even going further, the Kahn court agreed with the lower court
based on the company supporting a cause. Id. Of course, a single report is not nearly enough to
draw any firm conclusions.
118. Balotti & Hanks, supra note 85, at 967.
119. Id. at 978-980. See also Kahn, supra note 90, at 625-30 (defining "corporate social respon-
sibility" as the idea that, based on corporate ability, social necessity and morality, public corpo-
rations, especially large ones, have "an obligation to contribute to the betterment of society in a
manner distinct from the maximization of corporate profit and obedience to the law.").
120. CAL. CORP. CODE § 207(e) (2005). It is also clear that there is no benefit requirement in
states with two separate provisions for charitable donations. See Balotti & Hanks, supra note 85,
at 977. Since the second of the provisions deals specifically with donations that confer a benefit,
by implication, the first provision does not require a corporate benefit. Id.
121. Balotti & Hanks, supra note 85, at 976-978.
122. Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969).
123. Id.
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that the business judgment rule likely would have protected the Spe-
cial Committee's decision to make the donation from claims of breach
of duty of care.1 24 As Balotti and Hanks point out, the business judg-
ment rule is based on principles of profit maximization-principles
under which a corporate benefit would be required.1 25 Despite the
opinion of the Kahn court, with no concrete decision on this point to
date and a dearth of litigation concerning corporate donations, the
question of whether there is a corporate benefit requirement in states
like Delaware is still up in the air.
III. THE ORACLE LAWSUIT AND SETrLEMENT
A. Factual Background, Lawsuits Filed, and Procedural History
In early 2001, Larry Ellison, the CEO of Oracle Corporation t 26 and
owner of approximately one quarter of the company's stock, sold 29
million of his shares. 127 This sale, conducted over the course of one
week, netted Ellison nearly $900 million at an average price of $30.76
per share. 128 On March 1, 2001-one month after Ellison completed
his stock sales-Oracle announced its earning results from the just-
ended fiscal quarter. 129 The earnings failed to live up to Wall Street
expectations. 130 The news of the missed earnings resulted in Oracle's
stock price dropping precipitously; by mid-March, the stock was trad-
ing at just one-half of the price at which Ellison had sold his shares.131
Oracle shareholders proceeded to allege insider trading based on Elli-
son's sale of stock before the unfavorable earnings report. Sharehold-
ers filed what became three separate derivative lawsuits-one in
Delaware state court that was dismissed on summary judgment, 132 one
in federal court that is pending,133 and the one in the Superior Court
of California that is at issue here.134
124. Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 61 (Del. 1991).
125. Balotti & Hanks, supra note 85, at 977-978.
126. Oracle Corporation is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in California.
127. Jonathan D. Glater, Oracle's Chief in Agreement to Settle Insider Trading Lawsuit, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005, at C1.
128. Langberg, supra note 9.
129. Glater, supra note 127.
130. Id.
131. Langberg, supra note 9.
132. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 867 A.2d 904, 955 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff d 872 A.2d
960 (Del. 2005). The court based the dismissal on the failure of the plaintiffs to meet Delaware's
pleading requirements for scienter. Id.
133. In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., No. C-01-0988-MJJ (N.D. Cal. 2005).
134. In re Oracle Cases (Chairman of the Judicial Council JCC 4180), No. CIV417511 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 2005).
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Plaintiff Alan Pierce filed the first lawsuit in San Mateo County Su-
perior Court of California, alleging, inter alia, breach of fiduciary
duty, constructive fraud, and unjust enrichment in connection with El-
lison's sale of the 29 million Oracle shares. 135 Five other shareholders
filed separate lawsuits based on the same stock sales. 136 The courts
consolidated the six actions in San Mateo County Superior Court. 137
After the filing of a consolidated complaint, the court dismissed sev-
eral defendants and claims. 138 The remaining defendants were Larry
Ellison and Oracle Corporation. 139 The remaining claims were ac-
tions under California Corporations Code sections 25402 and
25502.140 The court scheduled the trial to begin in late September
2005.141
B. The Original Settlement: Negotiations, Terms, and
Court Rejection
Two months before the scheduled trial date, the parties began set-
tlement negotiations. 142 Retired judge Daniel Weinstein mediated
these negotiations. 43 On September 20, 2005, the parties filed their
original proposed settlement. 44 Ellison, the shareholder plaintiffs,
and Oracle's board of directors, including three independent direc-
tors, all approved this proposed settlement.1 45
The main provision of the original proposed settlement called for
Ellison to donate $100 million to charity in Oracle's name over a pe-
riod of five years. 146 While Ellison was to select the charity, Oracle
135. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, Oracle Cases (Chairman of the Judicial Coun-
cil JCCP 4180), No. CIV417511, 2005 WL 2396788 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 20, 2005).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, Oracle Cases (Chairman of the Judicial Coun-
cil JCCP 4180), No. CIV417511, 2005 WL 2396788 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 20, 2005).
139. Id.
140. Id. Section 25402 prohibits insider trading. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25402 (2005). Section
25502 states that a party who violates Section 25402 is liable for damages to the injured party.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25502 (2005).
141. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, Oracle Cases (Chairman of the Judicial Coun-
cil JCCP 4180), No. CIV417511, 2005 WL 2396788 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 20, 2005).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. Oracle outlines its charitable giving program on its website. For instance, Oracle lists
its charitable giving for the fiscal year 2005 as $7 million in cash donations and $162 million of in-
kind software donations. Oracle Corporation, Summary of Oracle's Commiument (2006), availa-
ble at http://www.oracle.com/corporate/community/cr-summary.pdf. One area of focus for Ora-
cle's charitable giving is education initiatives, particularly for science and technology education.
Id. See also Oracle Corporation, Oracle's Commitment (2006), available at http://www.oracle.
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had to approve the choice. 147 It is unclear by the settlement terms
whether Ellison or Oracle would be entitled to deduct the charitable
donations for tax purposes. 148 Moreover, the settlement required Or-
acle to make several changes to its corporate governance. 149 These
changes included allowing Oracle executives to have pre-planned
stock selling plans, establishing restricted trading windows before the
end of a quarter and immediately after the company releases earnings
reports, and tightening the company's policy of pre-clearing stock
trades by its employees.1 50 In regards to plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, the
settlement requested that Oracle pay approximately $24 million in
fees.15' However, the settlement stated that failure of the court to
agree to the requested attorneys' fees "shall not operate to terminate
or cancel the Stipulation [and Agreement of Settlement] or affect its
terms..., 152 Finally, the proposed settlement made clear that Ellison
would admit to no wrongdoing in connection with his stock sales in
2001.153
At a September 26, 2005 hearing, Judge John Schwartz of the San
Mateo County Court rejected the original proposed settlement.1 54
Judge Schwartz rejected the settlement after Oracle shareholder Don-
ald Titus filed an objection to the payment of the plaintiffs' attorneys'
fees by the company.1 55 The judge agreed with Titus that the problem
was that, while the settlement proceeds would go to charity, the par-
ties wanted Oracle to foot the bill for $24 million in plaintiffs' attorney
com/corporate/community/OraclesCommitment.pdf. Larry Ellison has also given significant
amounts to charity; in particular, Ellison donated $100 million to form the Ellison Medical Foun-
dation, which helps to finance "aging research." Press Release, American Federation for Aging
Research, Oracle CEO Larry Ellison and Pfizer Honored for Contributions to Ageing Research
(Nov. 15, 2004), available at http://www.afar.org/dinner-press-release.htm. See also Langberg,
supra note 9 (stating that Larry Ellison is "already giving away $30 million to $40 million a year"
to charity).
147. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, Oracle Cases (Chairman of the Judicial Coun-
cil JCCP 4180), No. CIV417511, 2005 WL 2396788 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 20, 2005).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, Oracle Cases (Chairman of the Judicial Coun-
cil JCCP 4180), No. CIV417511, 2005 WL 2396788 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 20, 2005).
153. Id.
154. California Judge Nixes Oracle CEO's Offer to Pay $100M to Charity to Settle Suits, supra
note 4.
155. Id.
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fees.156 The judge remarked, "It's a very good settlement, but I don't
see the corporation paying for it."157
C. The Revised Settlement: Terms and Court Acceptance
In response to the judge's rejection of the original proposed settle-
ment, the parties resumed negotiations, once again mediated by re-
tired judge Daniel Weinstein.15 8 The parties reached a revised
settlement, with the terms substantially the same as in the rejected
original settlement.159 The major change was that Ellison would now
pay up to $22 million in plaintiffs' attorneys' fees as opposed to Oracle
paying up to $24 million under the original settlement. 160 On Novem-
ber 22, 2005, Judge Schwartz approved the revised settlement and the
attorneys' fees, as required. 161 Based on his acceptance of the revised
settlement, Judge Schwartz dismissed the consolidated action with
prejudice.1 62
IV. ANALYSIS
This section will contend that courts should allow and, in fact, en-
courage settlements of shareholder derivative actions that primarily
provide for charitable donations, as long as the court is able to deter-
mine that such a settlement is fair, reasonable, and non-collusive. 163
156. Id.
157. Jonathan D. Glater, Judge Delays Oracle Suit Settlement, Citing Legal Fees, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 2005, at C3.
158. Supplemental Declaration of the Honorable Daniel Weinstein (Ret.) in Support of Mo-
tion for Approval of Revised Proposed Settlement and Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees
and Reimbursement of Expenses, Oracle Cases, No. CIV417511, 2005 WL 3279791 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Nov. 17, 2005).
159. Judgment of Dismissal, Oracle Cases, 2005 WL 3438589 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 2005)
(No. CIV417511). See also Bloomberg News, Oracle Chief to Pay Millions in Legal Fees, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2005, at C6.
160. Bloomberg News, supra note 159, at C6.
161. Judgment of Dismissal, Oracle Cases, No. CIV417511, 2005 WL 3438589 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Nov. 22, 2005). See also Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and
Costs, Oracle Cases, No. CIV417511, 2005 WL 3278775 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 2005).
162. Judgment of Dismissal, Oracle Cases, No. CIV417511, 2005 WL 3438589 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Nov. 22, 2005). On February 16, 2006, an appeal by an Oracle shareholder of the settlement
approval was voluntarily dismissed and the lower court disposition became final. Docket, People
v. Oracle Corp., No. A112891 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
163. Other articles propose reforms to the settlement stage of derivative litigation, calling for
improvement in preventing collusive settlements over the current court approval mechanism.
See generally Tim Oliver Brandi, The Strike Suit: A Common Problem of the Derivative Suit and
the Shareholder Class Action, 98 DICK. L. REV. 355 (2001); Andrew J. Sockol, A Natural Evolu-
tion: Compulsory Arbitration of Shareholder Derivative Suits in Publicly Traded Corporations, 77
TUL. L. REV. 1095 (2003); Mathew Anderson, An Intervention Requirement Provides Greater
Benefit to the Corporation When Nonparty Shareholders Appeal Derivative Action Settlements:
Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 1998)., 79 NEB. L. REV. 171 (2000). Proposals for such
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First, this Note will present the legal argument in support of allowing
both settlements calling for charitable donations and provisions re-
quiring the corporation to pay reasonable attorneys' fees in conjunc-
tion with such settlements. Second, taking into account the law
dealing with the power of corporations to make charitable donations,
a couple of issues that the courts will need to consider when they de-
termine whether to approve such settlements will be outlined. Next,
policy arguments will offer the reasons why courts should not only
allow but also encourage litigants to consider charitable donations
provisions during their settlement negotiations, particularly when the
plaintiff shareholder's claims appear weak. Finally, the Oracle Cases
settlement and its approval will be analyzed in terms of the legal
framework and policy goals presented in the earlier sub-sections.
A. How Courts Should Treat Settlements Providing Primarily for
Charitable Donation
1. Case Law Supports Allowing Charitable Donation
Based Settlements
Given the novelty of the Oracle Cases settlement, there is no prior
case law dealing specifically with settlements primarily providing for
charitable donations by the defendant in the name of the injured cor-
poration. Even so, the general treatment that courts should accord to
such settlements may be analogized to case law dealing with settle-
ments providing solely for non-pecuniary measures. A court should
approve a proposed settlement of a shareholder derivative action as
long as its proponents demonstrate that the settlement is fair and rea-
sonable under the circumstances. 164 The ultimate consideration is
whether the value of the consideration proffered justifies the release
of all claims on the corporation's behalf stemming from the alleged
facts. 165 Despite the difficulty that this presents in the evaluation of
settlements providing for non-pecuniary measures, which are difficult
to place a value on, courts like those in Bell Atlantic166 and
Caremark167 have not had a problem approving these settlements in
cases where the plaintiff's claims were weak. In fact, only one-half of
reforms, however, are outside the scope of this Note. This Note will deal with charitable dona-
tions settlements in the context of the current court approval mechanism for derivative lawsuit
settlements.
164. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 966 (Del. Ch. 1996).
165. Id. at 961.
166. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1314 (3d Cir. 1993).
167. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 972.
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approved derivative action settlements include any provision for mon-
etary damages. 168
There is no reason for why the basic view of courts concerning set-
tlements providing for charitable donations should be any different
from the view of courts about settlements that call for non-pecuniary
measures. To be sure, charitable donations present the problem of
being hard to value. However, this is the same potential criticism of
non-pecuniary settlements. Arguably, though still difficult, a charita-
ble donation of a certain dollar amount is likely to be easier to put a
value on than non-pecuniary measures with no dollar amount or other
quantitative measurement attached. The judge deciding whether to
approve a settlement does not need to be exacting; the judge is merely
required to make a reasoned judgment as to whether the settlement is
fair and reasonable. 169 Making a reasoned judgment is no more prob-
lematic with charitable donations settlements than with non-pecuniary
settlements.
Likewise, the court should treat the award of attorneys' fees in a
settlement providing for charitable donations in a way analogous to
the award of attorneys' fees resulting from non-pecuniary settlements.
In both cases, since there is no monetary damages provision to create
a common fund, the fee awards will fall under the substantial benefit
doctrine. 170 In Robbins v. Alibrandi, the court, while holding that the
trial court had erred in finding the negotiated attorneys' fees to be
fair, stated that under the substantial benefit doctrine "the benefit
need not be pecuniary. "171 As long as the corporation receives an
actual benefit from a charitable donation provided for in a settlement,
the corporation as real party of interest in the derivative litigation
should have to pay fair plaintiff's attorneys' fees that are either negoti-
ated as part of the settlement or awarded after a petition to the court.
2. Charitable Donations Settlements in Light of Corporate
Donations Law
The intersection of the law concerning the approval of shareholder
derivative lawsuits and the law dealing with the power of corporations
to make charitable donations presents a couple of important issues
with which the courts will need to deal. The first and most straightfor-
ward of these two issues is the application of the reasonableness test
168. Romano, supra note 29, at 61.
169. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 961.
170. Cziraki v. Thunder Cats, Inc., 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419, 423 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
171. 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 387, 393 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
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annunciated in Theodora.172 The court should not approve a settle-
ment that provides for a charitable donation made in the name of the
company that the company could not have made directly under the
reasonableness standard that governs corporate charitable donations
in general. Therefore, the court should impose an additional require-
ment and assess the reasonableness of the company making such a
donation in and of itself in addition to the inquiry made into the fair-
ness of the overall settlement. If, for instance, the donation mandated
by the terms of the settlement exceeds the current 10% of annual tax-
able income limit for federal tax deductions of charitable donations, 173
the court should reject the settlement regardless of the fairness and
reasonableness of the settlement value in consideration of terminating
the lawsuit.
The second issue-whether there should be a requirement that the
settlement donation confer a benefit on the corporation-is more
complicated. This Note contends that courts should require that char-
itable donations in the derivative lawsuit settlement context provide a
demonstrable benefit, whether direct or indirect, to the corporation.
Even after taking into consideration several arguments for concluding
otherwise in the non-settlement context, courts should conclude that
such a requirement is both necessary and workable. The issue of
whether to have a benefit requirement is complicated for two main
reasons.
First, as mentioned in the Background section, corporate donation
law in the non-settlement context clearly requires no benefit to the
corporation to result from a charitable donation in states with statutes
similar to the one in California 74 and is uncertain as to whether there
is any benefit required in states with statutes similar to the one in
Delaware 175. Moreover, it follows that a company receiving monetary
damages as the result of a derivative lawsuit could then turn around
and donate that money to charity, presumably without receiving a
benefit; the final result would be identical to the result if a settlement
provided for a charitable donation conferring no benefit on the corpo-
ration. However, a settlement cannot be fair and reasonable if there
is inadequate consideration given by the wrongdoer defendant in ex-
change for the plaintiff terminating his or her claim. 176 With a settle-
ment providing for a "personal aggrandizement" or "altruistic"
172. Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969).
173. 26 U.S.C.A. § 170(b)(2) (2005).
174. CAL. CORP. CODE § 207(e) (2005).
175. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (2005).
176. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 961 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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charitable contribution by the defendant, the consideration would
have no value to the corporation, and, therefore, could not possibly be
fair unless there was no merit to the plaintiff's claim; such a non-meri-
torious lawsuit should dismissed rather than settled. Only if the chari-
table donation provided for in the settlement confers a "demonstrable
benefit" can it be adequate consideration to support the end to litiga-
tion by settlement. A requirement that the court approving the settle-
ment find such a benefit helps to guard against a collusive settlement.
Second, Professors Balotti and Hanks express concern that a rule
requiring a benefit for charitable contributions in the non-settlement
context would present problems of both determining what exactly the
benefit might be and ignoring the corporate social responsibility and
public policy justifications for allowing altruistic corporate donations
to charity. 177 However, the concerns of Professors Balotti and Hanks
do not resonate the same way when a benefit requirement is limited to
the settlement context. The court would assess the benefits of the do-
nations but would not have to be exact. 178 Moreover, since a benefit
requirement would apply only in the context of settlements, this
would not undermine altruistic corporate donations but would be ap-
plying the requirement for the limited purpose of lessening the risk of
collusion in derivative action settlements.
3. Policy Arguments for Encouraging Charitable Donation
Based Settlements
The main policy argument in favor of not only allowing but also
encouraging, under the right circumstances, derivative lawsuit settle-
ments that provide for charitable donations by the defendant is the
generally favorable view that the legal system accords to negotiated
settlements. Public policy generally favors the voluntary settlement of
litigation as a means of avoiding unnecessarily protracted lawsuits. 179
This public policy is especially applicable to shareholder derivative lit-
igation. The court in Maher v. Zapata Corp. emphasized this, noting
that "[s]ettlment of shareholder derivative actions are particularly fa-
vored because such litigation is 'notoriously difficult and unpredict-
able' (citation omitted)."'180 The Maher court stated that, because of
this policy preference, courts do not "lightly reject" negotiated settle-
ments of derivative litigation. 81 Also indicative of the policy favoring
177. Balotti & Hanks, supra note 85, at 991.
178. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 961.
179. Neponsit Inv. Co. v. Abramson, 405 A.2d 97, 100 (Del. 1979).
180. Maher v. Zapata Corp. 714 F.2d 436, 455 (5th Cir. 1983).
181. Id.
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the settlement of derivative litigation is that, while the adequacy of the
settlement consideration balanced against the strength of the share-
holder plaintiff's claims is the primary factor in analyzing the fairness
of a settlement, courts have acknowledged that the avoidance of un-
necessary expense is also an important factor supporting the approval
of a settlement. 182
Of course, given the risk of unfair settlements of derivative actions
stemming from collusive dealing between the parties, courts have
sought to strike a balance between allowing settlements and prevent-
ing abuse of the settlement process. The balance that courts have
struck has been to remain amenable toward the settlement of deriva-
tive litigation for the aforementioned reasons but also, pursuant to the
court approval requirement, to assess independently that the settle-
ment is fair, reasonable, and the product of non-collusive bargaining.
Thus, the Maher court, immediately after indicating the preference for
ending litigation by settlement, proceeds to review the criteria for
court approval. 18 3
The above policy of favoring settlement of derivative litigation is as
equally applicable to charitable donation settlements as it is to settle-
ments providing for monetary damages or non-pecuniary measures.
The argument for encouraging charitable donations settlements is par-
ticularly compelling when a shareholder plaintiff's claims appear to be
weak. Once a court has found that such a settlement is fair, reasona-
ble and non-collusive, the general policy favoring settlement moves to
the forefront. This policy dictates that it is preferable to settle a claim
that is not very strong but does not warrant dismissal with a charitable
donation than it is to undergo further expensive, time-consuming, and
distracting litigation. The solution to the issues arising from charitable
donations settlements is not to go to the extreme of proscribing such
settlements but to strike the same balance between the competing
goals of promoting voluntary settlement and ensuring fairness in the
settlement process that the legal system has found sensible with other
types of settlements.
A second policy justification for the approval of charitable dona-
tions settlements is that such settlements help to fulfill the primary
purposes of shareholder derivative litigation, albeit, as is the case with
182. Lewis v. Anderson, 81 F.R.D. 436, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding the termination of the
derivative litigation-thus avoiding further expense, distraction of company management, and
uncertainty-to be the "most persuasive" of the purported benefits of the proposed settlement
at issue). See also Robbins v. Alibrandi, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 387, 396 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)396; see
also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1314 (3d Cir. 1993).
183. Maher, 714 F.2d at 455.
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all settlements, to a lesser extent than a plaintiff victory at trial. A
debate among commentators as to whether derivative litigation serves
the purpose of compensating the harmed corporation or the purpose
of deterring wrongful conduct remains unsettled. 18 4 Most derivative
lawsuit recoveries, however, will serve both of these purposes. 8 5 This
is the case with a charitable donation settlement conferring a "demon-
strable benefit" to the corporation, assuming that the settlement is
free from collusion. The deterrence objective is satisfied by the need
for the wrongdoer defendant to contribute to charity because of his or
her wrongdoing. Some of the commentators who were critical of the
Oracle Cases settlement expressed the concern that the settlement
would provide little punishment for Ellison, who already donates sig-
nificant sums to charity1 6; indeed, Ellison could merely donate less in
his own name to balance out the amount of money that he must do-
nate in Oracle's name. While this may reduce the punishment in the
Oracle Cases settlement, the deterrent effect will still hold in many
other situations where the wrongdoer defendant does not already
make large charitable donations. Moreover, there remains the com-
pensation objective of derivative lawsuits. The compensation objec-
tive is satisfied by the benefit to the corporation that results from the
charitable donation in the corporation's name.
A final policy reason that lends support to the case for allowing
derivative lawsuit settlements that provide for charitable donations by
the wrongdoer defendant is the beneficial impact this could have on
charitable giving. 18 7 To be sure, such settlement-driven charitable do-
nations, even if they were to go from being unusual to much more
commonplace, would still represent only a small portion of both over-
all charitable donations and charitable donations by corporations. 1
However, from the perspective of the individual charities that receive
donations provided for in settlements, the impact could be large; the
$100 million called for in the Oracle cases settlement, for instance,
could have a substantial positive benefit for the selected charities.
The above policy argument fits in well with the idea that corporate
charitable donations, even when providing a benefit to the corpora-
184. When Should Courts Allow the Settlement of Duty-of-Loyalty Derivative Suits?, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1084, 1088 (1996). "The Delaware courts have declined to declare an open alle-
giance to either the compensation or the deterrence rationale." Id. at 1090.
185. Id. at 1088.
186. See Langberg, supra note 9.
187. Of course, the impact of a charitable settlement on total charitable giving depends on
whether the defendant reduces his or her own charitable contributions in response.
188. See American Association of Fundraising Council, Giving USA 2005, available at http://
www.aafrc.org/press-releases/index.cfm?pg=trustreleases/tsunamigifts.html.
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tion, also can be justified on the grounds of "corporate social responsi-
bility." 189 The idea of corporate social responsibility states that "in
light of pressing social needs, the vastness of corporate wealth and
power, and evolving ethical norms, corporate America should make
increased social expenditures.' 90 To the extent that allowing charita-
ble donations settlements increases charitable giving, such settlements
further the end of corporate social responsibility. While most of cor-
porate law is driven by ideas of profit-maximization and economic ef-
ficiency, the idea of corporate social responsibility has gained
acceptance in both "public policy discourse" and in the law. 191 Thus,
while this may be a fairly minor policy point in favor of settlements
providing for charitable donations, it should not be totally dismissed.
B. Analysis of the Oracle Cases Settlement
This Note will now apply the above general discussion of settle-
ments providing for charitable donations to the settlements negotiated
between Oracle Corporation, Larry Ellison, and the Oracle share-
holders who brought the derivative suit based on the insider trading
allegations. First, the factors that could potentially weigh for or
against the approval of the settlement will be discussed. Second,
Judge Schwartz's rejection of the original proposed settlement and
subsequent approval of the revised settlement will be analyzed.
1. Factors Favoring and Disfavoring Approval of the
Proposed Settlement
The difficultly that a court faces when assessing the fairness and
reasonableness of a proposed settlement is apparent from listing some
of the factors that weigh for and against settlement of the Oracle law-
suit. The first factor among those that could possibly weigh in favor of
approval of settlement in the instant case is the potential benefit to
Oracle from the main charitable donations provision and the other
mandated changes in company policy to help prevent future insider
trading. 192 In addition, the Delaware courts dismissed litigation on
summary judgment brought in that state based on the same allega-
tions, calling into question the strength of the plaintiff shareholders'
189. Kahn, supra note 90, at 625-26.
190. Id. at 630.
191. Id. at 632. For example, Congress has indicated its support for the idea of corporate
social responsibility through corporate tax deductions for charitable contributions, including in-
creasing the ceiling on the deduction in 1981 from 5% to 10% of annual profits. Id. at 633.
192. See Judgment of Dismissal, Oracle Cases, No. CIV417511, 2005 WL 3438589 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Nov. 22, 2005).
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claims.1 93 Other factors favoring approval include that: 1) a former
judge acted as a mediator during the settlement negotiations;' 94 2) Or-
acle has to approve the donee of the settlement donation; 19 3) all the
parties expressed views that the settlement was fair, including inde-
pendent directors on the Oracle board;196 and 4) the litigation had
already lasted for four years and would continue without
settlement.197
However, there are also several factors weighing against approval
of a settlement of the derivative claims against Ellison. First, the do-
nees of the charitable donations arising out of the settlement were not
named in the settlement, making it impossible to discern whether
there would be any "demonstrable benefit" to the corporation. 98
Second, Ellison owns approximately 25% of outstanding Oracle stock,
giving him substantial control over the company; 199 this presumably
includes the settlement decision. Finally, the settlement did not clear
up whether Oracle would be entitled to claim the tax deductions from
the donations provided for in the settlement. 2°°
2. Judge's Rejection of the Original Settlement and Approval of
the Revised Settlement
Fully analyzing Judge Swartz's decision with respect to both the
original proposed Oracle Cases settlement and the approved revised
settlement is difficult given a limited record and no full written opin-
ion by the judge. Still, one minor and two larger potential flaws in the
judge's decisions concerning the Oracle settlement are discernable.
The potential minor flaw is that no reasonableness analysis pursuant
to Theodora was undertaken. This omission, however, is minor be-
cause the charitable donations provided for in the settlement are not
likely to fail this test. The settlement calls for $20 million donations in
each of five years; in any of the fiscal years between 2001 and 2005,
193. See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 867 A.2d 904, 955 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff d 872
A.2d 960 (Del. 2005).
194. Supplemental Declaration of the Honorable Daniel Weinstein (Ret.) in Support of Mo-
tion for Approval of Revised Proposed Settlement and Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees
and Reimbursement of Expenses, Oracle Cases, No. CIV417511, 2005 WL 3279791 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Nov. 17, 2005).
195. Judgment of Dismissal, Oracle Cases, No. CIV417511, 2005 WL 3438589 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Nov. 22, 2005).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Glater, supra note 127, at C1.
200. See Judgment of Dismissal, Oracle Cases, No. CIV417511, 2005 WL 3438589 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Nov. 22, 2005).
20061
652 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
this would represent less than 1% of Oracle Corporation's net in-
come.201 Since this is well below the 10% limit for tax deductions for
charitable donations, a court would likely find the donations provided
for in the Oracle settlement to be reasonable.
A more substantial problem with the Oracle settlement is that it
does not name the specific donations that Ellison will make pursuant
to the settlement. Instead, the settlement merely provides for Ellison
to pick the recipients subject to approval by Oracle's board of direc-
tors.202 The problem with this is that, despite the safeguard of having
Oracle approve the donees, there is no way for a court to discern
whether a benefit will be conferred on Oracle by the settlement dona-
tions. As such, Judge Schwartz could not possibly have considered
whether the charitable donation would provide a "demonstrable ben-
efit" in his approval of the revised settlement.
In addition, the judge rejected the original proposed settlement in
this case and approved a revised settlement with the only change be-
ing that, instead of Oracle paying the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, Ellison
would be responsible for paying millions of dollars in fees.20 3 The
judge said the original proposed settlement was "very good" but re-
jected it because of attorneys' fees that it asked Oracle to pay.20 4
However, assuming that the judge finds a substantial benefit, then the
court should award fees under the substantial benefit doctrine. These
fees should be payable by Oracle rather than Ellison, as "[t]he obliga-
tion to reimburse expenses to a shareholder who brings a successful
derivative action should be the obligation of the corporation and not
an obligation of the defendants. ' 20 5 Under the American Rule, courts
only shift fees to defendants in rare situations. 20 6 As such, in corpo-
rate litigation, such as this, fee shifting is an "exception, rather than
the rule. ' 20 7 There is no equitable reason for fee shifting in the Oracle
settlement. Even if the judge determined that the negotiated fees
were too high, the settlement specifically stated that if the judge low-
ered the fee award, this would not negate the other settlement
201. See Oracle Corporation, Form 10-K, available at http://www.oracle.com/corporatelinves-
tor-relations/10lk2005.pdf.
202. Judgment of Dismissal, Oracle Cases, No. CIV417511, 2005 WL 3438589 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Nov. 22, 2005).
203. Bloomberg News, supra note 159. at C6.
204. Glater, supra note 127, at C3.
205. 13 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE COR-
PORATIONS § 6044 (2006).
206. Id.
207. Id.
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terms.20 8 Therefore, the judge could have ordered Oracle to pay less
than the negotiated amount of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees if he felt this
was too high given the work done by the attorneys and the outcome of
the case.
V. IMPACT
The impact of the Oracle Cases settlement is difficult is gauge.
Given the novelty of the settlement in the instant case, how far-reach-
ing and influential it will be remains uncertain; previous settlements,
such as in the EBay settlement, have only provided for part of the
damages to go directly from the defendant to charity.20 9 Despite these
uncertainties over the impact of this settlement, there are a couple
possibilities.
On one hand, the Oracle settlement may be an anomaly or an ex-
ample of what will become a rare phenomenon in derivative litigation,
either because parties do not negotiate settlements providing mainly
for charitable donations or because courts refuse to approve such set-
tlements. The commentators who were critical of the Oracle settle-
ment, besides disapproving of Oracle having to pay millions of dollars
in the ultimately rejected original proposed settlement, were more
widely concerned that charitable donations settlements will not really
benefit the corporation and its shareholder and is merely an example
of a corporate defendant trying to "game the system. ' 210 If the argu-
ments of these critics win out, the Oracle settlement may remain the
lone or rare example of this type of settlement.
On the other hand, given the benefits of settling derivative litigation
and the court approval requirement already used to determine
whether a settlement is fair, courts and litigating parties might find
settlement involving charitable donations to be an attractive option,
especially when the plaintiff's claims are not very strong. However,
while the court in this case did approve the settlement, there are
clearly some unresolved issues with this type of settlement should it
become more prevalent, including how the court should handle the
awarding of attorneys' fees and how stringent any benefit requirement
should be.
208. See Judgment of Dismissal, Oracle Cases, No. CIV417511, 2005 WL 3438589 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Nov. 22, 2005).
209. California Judge Nixes Oracle CEO's Offer to Pay $100M to Charity to Settle Suit, supra
note 4.
210. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Despite some potential flaws, the novel settlement in the Oracle
Cases posits a new avenue for parties negotiating an end to time-con-
suming and costly derivative litigation. Courts should both allow and
encourage settlements that provide solely or primarily for charitable
donations by the defendant in the name of the corporation, as long as
the courts determine that such settlements are fair, reasonable, and
reached in the absence of collusive behavior. Courts should treat
charitable donation settlements similarly to non-pecuniary settle-
ments, which are also difficult to value. As further assurance that a
charitable donations settlement is non-collusive and fair, courts
should: 1) apply the Theodora reasonableness test and 2) require that
a "demonstrable benefit" to the corporation result from the dona-
tions. In addition, policy reasons for encouraging such settlements in-
clude: 1) our legal system's preference for the voluntary settlement of
litigation, 2) the fulfillment of the main objectives of derivative litiga-
tions, and 3) the potential benefit of such settlements to individual
charities. It will now be interesting to observe whether the novel set-
tlement in the Oracle Cases becomes more commonplace or whether
it is merely a blip in the history of derivative litigation settlements.
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